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A GERMAN REPLIES TO "J'ACCUSE"

A SLANDERER

NOTES ON THE HISTORY
OF THE
PERIOD PRECEDING
THE WORLD WAR

By

PROF. DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN

ISSUES AND EVENTS
NEW YORK

Price 25 cents



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UNDER the French title "J'accuse" there has been published in the German language, but on the soil of French Switzerland, a pamphlet "by a German" which will doubtless be greeted as highly gratifying in France, England, Russia, and wherever else Germany's enemies are weaving their intrigues. The anonymous author has borrowed from the Russian coat of arms the title vignette: St. George thrusting his lance down the dragon's throat. But he sets over it this verse as motto:

Wer die Wahrheit kennt und sagt sie nicht,
Der ist fürwahr ein erbärmlicher Wicht!¹)

The "Accuser" has chosen as sponsor a Swiss living in Lausanne, Dr. Anton Suter, who has the impudence to take upon himself the responsibility for the publication of this libel, and to commend it as an "act which can turn out to be nothing but a blessing to the German people and to mankind." This Mr. Suter was clearly incapable of seeing through the misstatements and the downright falsehoods which the "accuser" tries to foist on undiscriminating or hopelessly prejudiced readers.

No, the author of "J'accuse" is in no respect "a German patriot," but a deliberate slanderer who well knows from personal experience that, of all the masks behind which slander conceals its true features, that of the heart-broken patriot is the most effective. He very well knows that what he presents to his readers as "the truth" is merely that prearranged list of accusations—garnished with poisonous sophistries of his own manufacture—with which our enemies are trying to win over the public opinion of the world.

¹Who knows the truth and brings it not to light
He is, in sooth, a pitiable wight.

With that truth which may not be kept dark, the contents of "J'accuse" have nothing in common. A chain of assertions is presented to us which have as little to do with actual facts as those predictions of this "German" in which our economic, military, and moral downfall are foretold. Today no one believes in such an outcome, not even in the camp of our enemies, no, not even those Augurs who, in the hope of some such denouement, set in motion the chain of events that led to the world war—Poincaré, Asquith, Goremeykin, who allowed their names to be used to cover the secret work of Delcassé, Grey, Iswolski and Ssassonow. Today all of them are looking forward with horror to the moment when the structure which they wished to erect will collapse and bury them under its ruins. And with them, under the burden of his shame, will collapse this "accuser," when the German people in its hour of victory turns away with loathing from those who had hoped to profit by flinging mud at their own fatherland.

"J'accuse" starts out with the chapter, "Germany, Awake!" Its aim is to give the German reader a light by which to perceive the following of the Accuser's "truths":

1. That this war was long since planned and prepared for by Germany, not only on the field of war, but of politics;
2. That it had long since been agreed that this war of aggression should be presented to the German people as a war of liberation, since it was known that only in this way could the necessary enthusiasm be counted on;
3. That the object of this war was to be the achievement of the hegemony of the continent and, in the course of time, the conquest of England's position as a world power, in accordance with the principle: ôte-toi de là que je m'y mette!

Has a more shameless inversion of the truth ever been heard from the mouth of a German to the prejudice of his own fatherland?

We oppose him with the following propositions:

1. That this war was desired by France in the first instance, was brought closer to realization by the Russian-French alliance, and, through England's joining hands with these conspirators, became, under English leadership, necessary and inevitable;
2. That these three powers had long since resolved to break Germany's powerful strategic position in Central Europe, and had been systematically working to educate the world up to the notion that this proceeding is a moral necessity;
3. That in this war which has been thus forced on us our goal should be the permanent safeguarding of our borders and the freeing of the seas from English tyranny.

The actual contents of the "accusation," and our own

contrasting point of view, have now been clearly characterized, as far as fundamentals go. But the anonymous accuser tries through four further sections of his book to bolster up those theses of his which are not, as he would have it appear, formulated for the German people, but for the enemies of our people. He calls them:

II. History of the Period Preceding the Crime (N. B. our crime).

III. The Crime.

IV. Consequences of the Deed.

V. The Future and Epilogue.

Unedifying as the task is, we mean to follow him up, step by step.

The "History of the Period Preceding the Crime" includes pages 25 to 113, and begins with a section on: "Our Imperialists: Bernhardi & Co."

The author's first great falsification is this—that he treats "imperialism" as if it expressed a German desire for world conquest, whereas word and conception are, as everyone knows, of English origin, and were coined on the occasion of the British Colonial Conferences at Queen Victoria jubilee. It was only by a malicious distortion that they were later applied to the tendencies of German politics and the currents in the soul of the German people. The writings of General von Bernhardi, moreover, which the author attacks, appeared—a fact that has naturally also been left unmentioned—in 1912, at a time when the aggressive policies of the powers of the Triple Entente left no doubt that soon or late we should have to reckon on a coalition of England, Russia and France, whose goal was no less than our political humiliation, to be followed, as a logical consequence, by the annihilation of the German position and power. It was the old prescription: avilir, puis démolir. The brave books of Bernhardi, with a clear prevision of what was in preparation, pointed out the necessity of grasping the sword before the conspiracy which threatened Germany should become active. That was the more his perfect right since the threat of war, particularly on the part of England and Russia, had, as we shall see, for years never let up. But it is a downright falsification to identify the advice of Bernhardi with the secret aims of our government. His writings—insofar as they were not of a purely military character—were inopportune and unwelcome to the government, since it foresaw the misuse to which they could be put by the evilly inclined. Today it is unlikely that anyone will deny that Bernhardi saw and judged the situation correctly. The distinguished American, Thomas C. Hall, Professor of Christian ethics in New York, and now lecturing at Göttingen as exchange professor, vigorously repudiated the hypocritical expressions of indignation over the writings of

Bernhardi and Treitschke as early as January, 1915. "How many who are horrified at Bernhardi or Treitschke have really read either of these men and really know what they stand for? They are indeed free from some of the ingrained 'homage our vices pay to virtue,' but there is not an opinion expressed on force and war that could not be matched with a hundred quotations from English and American sources, including such apostles of peace as Mr. Roosevelt, Dr. Lyman Abbott and Lord Roberts. Both men, however, knew what they were talking about and do not pretend that a pagan world about us is really governed by Christian principles!"

It is also a historically untenable proposition to say that a preventive war cannot, after its own fashion, be a defensive war. What was the war which Frederick the Great waged for seven long years for the maintenance of the Prussian state, if not a defensive war in which he would have been lost had he not played the *praevenire*. That saying so often used in the 17th Century, "*Melius est praevenire quam praeveniri*," describes exactly the decision which Frederick had to make, and corresponds to the conditions with which we had to reckon in 1914.

But the "Accuser" even goes so far as to include the German-Austrian Alliance among those facts which he embraces under the catchword, "Preliminary History of the Crime," without permitting himself to be turned aside by the particular fact that this combination, and the later accession of Italy, kept the peace of Europe for 44 years. In this "Preliminary History" he treats our "senseless" colonial policy, our efforts to secure a "place in the sun," which, as he interprets it, is made to mean that we are striving for the exclusive place in the sun and for world mastery; for he thus states it—the place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the others. Equally superficial and "inspired" are the sections that follow, pages 55 to 68. They are not worth referring to, especially as in the later sections the same questions are constantly being taken up. But a very decided protest must be lodged against the author's way of introducing his opinion with the word "we" and trying in this way to seem to be one with us. We have as little in common with the sentiments of this "German," as with what he represents as truth, but which in reality is a web of ignorance and of conscious falsification of fact. This shows itself in the most pronounced way in the sections on "The Policy of Isolation" and "The First Hague Conference." The "Accuser" seeks to explain away the "Policy of Isolation" as a merely geographical conception, and flatly declares that there is no proof of England's aggressive designs against us. As we shall, in the course of this exposition, bring out facts which leave no doubt as to England's

aggressive designs, we shall now take up the section on "The First Hague Conference," which demands a more searching criticism.

The First Hague Conference

It is in connection with the first Hague Conference that the "Accuser" tries to show that English love of peace and German pettifoggery stood at that time in fixed opposition, and that our policies caused the collapse of a magnanimous attempt on the part of England at peace and reconciliation. The so-called Peace Manifesto of Nicolas II of August 12th 24th 1898¹ which, as everyone knows, suggested a decreasing of armaments and the calling of a conference for the consideration of measures to secure universal peace, serves as his point of departure.

The "Accuser" seems to know nothing of the political antecedents of this Russian proposal. He contents himself with referring to Bloch's well-known book¹ and to Salisbury's wail over the cost of armament in the year 1869. The naive notion that the Czar had read these things does not deserve refutation. On the other hand it is not unimportant to learn the true connection of events which led to the calling of the first so-called peace conference. On March 27, 1898, was signed the agreement which, to the bitter anger of Japan, established the cession to Russia of the Lino-Tung Peninsula and of Port Arthur. Shortly afterwards, on the 20th of May, Japan had to leave Wei-Hai-wei as well, which was then at once occupied by the English. The English competition in East Asiatic waters had been watched with growing displeasure in Russia, and as early as the 8th of April, 1898, the "Nowoje Wremja," which then, as so often before and since represented the designs of the Russian foreign office, threatened a Russian-Japanese alliance in the event of England's carrying out her dangerous designs in the Gulf of Petschili. If England were to establish itself permanently in Wei-hai-wei, Russia would demand an extension of its territory in Central Asia. Indeed, on the 7th of April the "N. W." went so far as to declare that the Anglo-Russian agreement of March 11, 1895, was no longer to be considered binding.

But that meant that the Anglo-Russian conflict over Central Asia, which had been adjusted with such difficulty, might again break out, and was calculated to frighten England, whereas, as a matter of fact the anxiety was on the Russian side. It was in connection with these events that the disarmament proposal in question was made. It was made under the very correct impression that England which was always parading its humanitarian sentiments,

¹Wrongly set by the accuser as the 28th of August.

¹Iwan Stanislawowitsch: "The Future War," 6 vols., Petersburg 1898 (Russian).

would not be able to reject it. It was believed that this could be counted on the more, as England had at that very time (the 10th of July) insulted France in deadly fashion at Fashoda, and was simultaneously making preparations for the war against the Transvaal. Directly after this Russian disarmament proposal, Russia and France made feverish efforts to increase their navy. The Czar, who as early as March, 1898, had appropriated the sum of 90 million roubles for the extension of his fleet, ordered the completion of the work to be hastened as much as possible; and in France a subscription was taken up for the building of submarines, although point 4 of the program for the peace conference proposed by the Russian Minister of foreign affairs, Murawjew, expressly prohibited this method of warfare. In the royal speech at the opening of the English parliament in February, 1899, the Russian proposal was referred to with scepticism. "We must," said Lord Salisbury in the Upper House, "keep clearly in mind the dangers and imperfections of the relations in which we live, and be resolved not to owe our peace to the consideration, or to the love of peace, of others. That would be criminal!"

So when on May 18, 1899, the Hague Conference was opened, it was met with the utmost distrust in all the organs of the government party, the English Unionists. The "Standard" of June 21, 1899, declared that the safeguarding of private property at sea, proposed at the conference, would result in the downfall of the English Sea Power. "When it comes to serious business conventions count for little;" our "most vital interests, our trade, demands that we reserve to ourselves the right of attack which we owe to our sovereignty of the sea." And that the plan for the safeguarding of private property at sea collapsed because of England, is well known. England it was, too, that reserved for itself the use of dum-dum bullets. In January, 1900, the "Standard" was still exercised over the idea of neutral goods in neutral harbors being non-contraband. It called this an "extravagant proposal" and declared: "Our naval officers will continue to search suspicious ships in African waters, whatever nationality they may belong to. When necessary, damages will be paid." And as to the use of stinking gases, both England and the United States declared that they could not give them up!

In the face of these facts stands the shameless assertion of the "Accuser" that—"In the whole course of the conference, ever the same picture: England at the head of all efforts to lessen the intolerable burden of armament and to place the points of difference between civilized peoples more and more completely on a basis of justice. On the side of England—France, Russia, America, and, naturally, the smaller states. And on the opposite side, always, Germany, followed by Austria-Hungary."

We wish to contrast with this glorification of England a French view which appeared on July 19, 1899, the day on which the first Hague Conference was closed, and which waxes ironical over the attitude of England at the conference, in the following cutting manner: "There are persons who do not love England; certainly they are in the wrong. England is a great liberal country, whose diplomacy has the highest respect for international agreements and binding promises. England is before all else concerned with securing, from one pole to the other, the recognition of the eternal principles of humanity. England has made humanitarian sentiments an article of export, like alcohol, or cotton, and if it occasionally appears that England does not herself act upon the precepts which she urges upon others, this is merely due to her Christian humility."

"England hates the bloody laurels that are plucked on the battlefield; the English work harder than any other people to realize the dream of eternal peace; nor will England ever be found to let a war loose upon the world, unless, of course, it is to England's advantage."

"England desires that, in any case, the future wars shall take place under the most humane conditions imaginable, and would gladly deny its neighbors the use of dangerous weapons which can bring mourning to so many families in which England is interested. When the day comes when the European States wish to give up their armies, and more especially, to turn their navies into scrap-iron, England will not oppose them. Indeed it would be incompatible with the English love of freedom to interfere in such cases: If you grant them the liberty of arming themselves to the teeth, they have nothing against our being prohibited all weapons, even to the sword-stick. They found it, too, in very bad taste at the Hague Conference when an attempt was made to deny them the use of the dum-dum bullets, in their intercourse with weaker peoples. Do you know what the dum-dum bullets are? (There follows a description, which I omit). The English who have already tried out the beneficence of this invention on their subjects, the Hindus, are unwilling, in their zeal for the spread of civilization, to withhold it from the Boers also. According to a London despatch, 30 miltrailleuses, arranged for dum-dum cartridges, are being shipped to Capetown. In this, too, the humane spirit of our friends across the channel makes itself recognized. One may actually hope that, thanks to the use of these instruments, the war against the Boers will not be of long duration and that the most absolute quiet will soon reign in the Transvaal. Therefore, since war is a scourge of the human race, England will, by avoiding long, bloody struggles, have once more taken over—**thanks to its good-**

ness of heart and the gentleness of its customs—the leadership of the peoples."

The deep bitterness toward England which at that time ran through the whole of France brought matters in November of that year to the point that France and Russia sounded us as to an alliance against England; and, because of the great sympathy of our people for the struggling Boers, a definite turning against England would, at the time, have been taken up in Germany with jubilation.

What held us back from this was consideration for England and the very slight confidence with which, even at that time, this combination of allies was looked upon in many circles—as well as the fact that there was no direct interest of Germany's in question. And Emperor William remained firm as a rock in his resolve not to unsheathe the sword for any but German interests.

What, moreover, could one expect of a Russian ally who shouted to us through his press that the entrance of Germany into the Russo-French combination would create the impression "of putting assafoetida into a fragrant bouquet"¹ and from a French ally whose foreign minister, Delcassé, made on the 24th of November, only a few months after the close of the Hague Conference, a speech which endeavored, with very little attempt at concealment, to strengthen in the French the hope of "Revenge" through Russia's help.

But in February, 1900, Eduard Hervé delivered, at the reception of Deschanel into the Academy, an address in which he ardently championed the idea of a Russian-French-English alliance, of which the result was to be "le partage de l'Allemagne."² These were the shadows which the Anglo-French entente (being prepared by Delcassé, and destined to be the source of all the evil which has since overtaken Europe), cast before them.

Of these things the "Accuser" with his smatterings of history, naturally knows nothing.

We, however, consider it particularly worth while to linger over these first important stages of the world conflict which was preparing.

The struggle of the English parties brings it to pass that occasionally the truth as to the motives and aims of English politics is clearly and strongly expressed. It is the Irish for the most part, who have taken it upon themselves to sharpen the conscience of the English; it is always without political results, but its value as witness to suppressed truth remains. At the very time when Deschanel, and

¹"Now. Wr." No. 8399.

²Feb. 1, 1900. The speech of Deschanel which followed was even more poisonously anti-German; it also set up the ideal of an Anglo-Franco-Russian Alliance pointed against Germany.

Hervé were working up their enthusiasm over the idea of an alliance with England (in spite of Fashoda and in spite of Maskat), the Irish Nationalist, Timothy Michael Healy, delivered a speech in the House of Commons in which he was moved by the impression made by England's disgraceful defeats in the Transvaal, to remark that the English seemed to believe that the Almighty had given them a certificate of title to the universe, and they therefore regarded every reverse they met with as a breach of contract. "But I do not believe"—he went on—"that the Good God will always be English." In view of the treaties which England has broken, no nation can bank on England's sense of honor, so long as stock exchange diplomacy continues. They want to turn the whole world into a stock company, take the twelve apostles into their company, with limited liability, and to lift up their hands like the Pharisees and demand of the other nations that they rejoice over it."¹

These were the moods which accompanied that Boer War which was fought under false colors—ostensibly for the freeing of the Uitlanders, supposed to have been injured by the Boers, but really for the winning of the goldfields of the Rand and the diamond fields of the Orange Republic, whose riches so intoxicated the imaginations of the English kings of finance that they regarded every opposition to the attainment of this goal as a crime against humanity. For England is humanity.¹ This psychological atmosphere it is which provides the explanation for the fact that when, in November, 1900, the Boers were showing a power of resistance which the English had considered impossible, the "Standard" could write: "The burning of the farms and the wasting of the lands of the refractory Boers seems not to have had the necessary effect. But there are other measures by which agitators and midnight murderers can be brought to submission, and these measures must be resorted to without delay. The lives of British soldiers are somewhat more valuable than those of Dutch rebels!!"²

The World Alliance Against Germany.

The period between the first and the second Hague Conference, that is, between May, 1899, and July, 1907, is dis-

¹This, in answer to the "Accuser" who has the audacity to maintain that we have taken over the ancient Jewish idea of being the chosen people of God. This notion, in all its grotesque onesidedness, has, on the contrary, remained since the days of Cromwell, specifically English. Compare on this point the highly characteristic remarks of Sir Roger Casement, "England's Achilles Heel." (Berlin, 1915, pp. 32-33.)

¹In passing be it remarked that from 1895 until after the Boxer uprising the English firm of "Kaynochs Munitions Co," supplied China with guns and ammunition; and the head of this firm was Arthur Chamberlain, brother of Joseph Chamberlain.

²This saying should be incorporated in the coat of arms which England will undoubtedly grant to the new English Field Marshal, Botha.

posed of by the "Accuser" in less than four pages. He thereby suppresses three facts which, together with the Morocco question, have determined the destinies of the world; and as to the conflict over Morocco—it was a crisis which had a permanent effect on world politics and particularly on Anglo-German relations.

The reference is, of course, to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of January 30, 1902, whereby England again took up the plan of attacking Russia, which had been frustrated by the Czar's disarmament proposal of 1898; the co-operation of the English and German fleets against Venezuela from December, 1902, to May, 1903; and, third, the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente on the 8th of April, 1904, which Delcassé and Lord Lansdowne signed.

In view of the present world situation a detailed exposition is not required of how the Anglo-Japanese alliance not only justified itself as a means of annihilating (or shall we say "disarming after the English fashion") the Russian sea power, but also proved serviceable as a ready instrument for the disposing of England's troublesome German competitor.

It has remained less in the memory of the present generation that it is from the co-operation of England and Germany against the violent tyranny of Castro in Venezuela (which defied all justice and all the obligations he had entered into), that that practice of casting suspicion on Germany, which has never since let up, is to be dated. Then it was that the watchword of a world alliance against Germany was first given out by the politicians of the "National Review"; and it is characteristic that, in spite of the points of political antagonism between England and Russia, which were becoming ever sharper, English and Russian journalists¹ were agreed that the co-operation of these two rivals was the necessary perquisite to the attainment of this ideal.

As the third member of their alliance, both these countries considered the nation which for centuries had been Germany's antagonist—France. In the French cabinet, ever since the late autumn of 1898, there was felt the decisive influence of a man whose thoughts were directed toward creating a political situation which should offer France the opportunity for that "Revenge" for which it yearned so eagerly. M. Delcassé, whom we herewith introduce as the first organizer of the world war, M. Delcassé, who managed to hold his own in five successive ministries of divergent political tendencies as director of the foreign policy of France—M. Delcassé could not, directly after the impres-

¹They were, to name only the most poisonous members of this group of conspirators, Messrs. Maxse, Blennerhasset, Wesselitzki and Tatischev. That the French, however, have a prior claim on the idea has already been mentioned.

sion made by the Fashoda Affair, think of stretching a friendly hand toward England. So he took up the idea, very popular in France at that time, of a union of the Latin races under French leadership. Camille Barrère, ambassador at Rome since 1899, identified his ambition with that of Delcassé, and their combined efforts succeeded, despite Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance, in inducing the Zanardelli Ministry, in which Prinetti was foreign minister, to sign an agreement, of which Italy's betrayal of its allies was one of the consequences.

It will be useful to follow through to its final consequences this French-Italian intrigue in which Russia, too, and England were later drawn in as assistant seducers.

A speech of Barrère's on January 1, 1902, first called the attention of the world to the fact that a change in the grouping of the powers was preparing. What became known was this, that agreements were exchanged between France and Italy which, to permit of Italy's later establishing itself in Tripoli, forbade France to advance east of Tunis; and that England had granted the Italians considerable concessions in the matter of Tripoli's eastern border. Thus Crispi's plan of receiving a compensation for Italy's renunciation to Tunis seemed to be brought close to realization.

In reality, the Italian-French agreement of 1902 had a much wider scope. It appears that the price Italy paid for the concessions made to her, was the obligation to hold herself neutral in a war between Germany and France. The subordination to France in which Italy thereby placed herself showed itself first at the Algeciras Conference, and then through the fact that, when the Russian-French affiliation broadened out into a Triple Entente, England and Russia also entered into such intimate relations with Italy that the Triple Alliance became, in fact, an illusion. In October, 1909, were concluded those arrangements between Italy and Russia at Racconigi, whereby the former was made secretly to serve the Russian policies in the Near Orient; and that the position of Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance, to which the epithet "equivocal" could hardly be applied any longer, was completely undermined.

Then in the year 1911, when Italy's war against Turkey broke out, the contents of Italy's agreement with France—which had still been kept strictly secret—revealed themselves through the fact that the troops sent to Tripoli were not taken from the neutral Swiss, nor from the Austrian, but from the French frontier, which was completely denuded of Italian troops. From this it was correctly concluded by those within the Triple Entente that henceforth the point of issue would be the winning over of Italy to an active co-operation with the enemies of Germany and Austria. The point of attack became Albania, where Italy

was pledged, in case of war, to act hand in hand with Austria, and, if it came to the point of defending the principle of Albania's integrity, to give Austria armed help. In the negotiations over this matter, in which it appears that Iswolski took part, directly or indirectly, it was represented to the Italians that in 1902, and again at Racconigi, they had assumed obligations which were inconsistent with an advocacy and support of Austria's interests. And it was very forcibly brought home to the Italians that France and Russia would stand firmly together in case of a far-reaching Austro-Serbian conflict.

Iswolski became convinced that Italy believed it could get better support for its designs from the powers of the Entente than from its allies. In Petersburg and Paris, therefore, it was no longer considered immediately necessary to work for a secession of Italy from the Triple Alliance; the existing relationship, in which Italy practically paralyzed the policies of the others, seemed in every way more advantageous. And such was, in truth, the state of things which existed up to the time of Italy's break with her two allies. The Italian diplomats could hardly do enough to show their confidence in their friends of the Entente, and at the same time suffered the Italian General Staff to discuss with our own, military measures in the event of a war. Even at that time it was a non plus ultra of perfidy. Ssassonow's stay in Paris in August, 1912, only a few months after the "unchanged" renewal of the Triple Alliance had been arranged between Secretary of State von Kiderlen-Wächter and San Giuliano, and a quarter of a year before the renewal became a fact, resulted, because of the good relations in which France and Russia stood to Italy, in a cessation of efforts to make Italy join the Entente. It was no secret that the existing "relation of confidence" was considered more useful. That the French were nevertheless distrustful of Italy can be readily understood, since they knew that they were dealing with a friend who was very free of bias, and who might easily make a new change of front. In the summer of 1913 the French had, as the passionate polemics in the "*Temps*," "*Débats*" and "*Matin*" showed, a suspicion that Italy might, in the end, and in spite of everything, cause a shift of the balance of power in the Mediterranean for the benefit of the Triple Alliance. Nothing but repeated, clear-cut declaration that the Triple Alliance treaty had in no way been altered, had a pacifying effect. This was held in Paris to indicate that Italy considered itself now as before, bound by its arrangement with France.

In July, 1914, the hostility with which the Russian press attacked Prince William of Albania seems to have resulted in increased friendliness between Russia and Italy; at any

rate it is a fact that the Italians were at that time not displeased when Rumania's attitude toward Austria became more and more equivocal, thus entering on a policy which the newspapers in Paris and Petersburg felt that they could prescribe—very unequivocally—not only for Rumania, but for Italy as well.

Further indications of the faithless and treacherous policy of Italy during the last twelve years are not wanting. These will, it may be absolutely counted on, reveal themselves at the right time. The latest thing in this respect became known through the revelations of the "Secolo" of July 13th of this year—namely that Italy had concluded its offensive and defensive alliance with the Triple Entente powers one month before its declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, and had, since the 25th of April, 1915, continued negotiations with us and with Austria merely to "pull the wool over our eyes." I think these facts will suffice to make clear a side of the "Preliminary History of the Crime," of which the "Accuser" who lays claim to a knowledge of the "Truth" obviously knew nothing at all. Furthermore, it casts a clear light upon the means used by Russia and France to attain their end—war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The "Accuser," to be sure, raises the question: Where is the proof that France wished us harm? He denies that in Russia there exists a "hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-slavic lust"; to him the Triple Entente is a harmless defensive alliance; and the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, done with the approval and the previous permission of Russia, a challenge to Russia and Servia, despite the fact that their diplomacy consisted, from beginning to end, of an attack on Austria put through in perfect unison.

Bosnia and the Herzegovina, as everyone knows, formed a part of Turkey, and never belonged to Servia, and certainly not to Russia. And Turkey soon came to realize that the occupation, and the annexation which, after the well-known vacillations, followed it, really meant a barrier against the hereditary enemy, Russia. Aleko Pasha, who as ambassador first in Vienna and then in Paris had won an insight into political reality, had recognized this as early as 1878.

Indeed, because of the superficiality of the "Accuser's" historical knowledge, and this unscientific method of investigation, which consists of bringing together scattered fragments of various transactions and arranging them with a conscious eye to their effect, his whole "Preliminary History of the Crime" is to be condemned as completely worthless, politically and historically. And the same is true of the arguments which he includes under the title "The Crime"

and whose substance he imparts to the world in the form of judicial pronouncements.

These verdicts of the "Accuser"—who at the same time sets up as judge, are as follows:

"Austria is guilty, alone, or in common with others, of having brought on the European war."

"Germany is guilty, in common with Austria, of having brought on the European war."

"Against England I can find no grounds for an accusation. Sir Edward Grey has earned, as no one else has, the title 'Peacemaker of Europe.' His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having worked for the maintenance of peace with untiring zeal, with cleverness and energy, will remain ineffaceable in history."

"Russia is completely innocent of the European war, and the guilt falls on Germany and Austria alone."

"France." This section is a hymn in praise of the French diplomacy, and starts out with the sentence, "L'Empire d'Allemagne supportera devant l'histoire l'écrasante responsabilité."

Thus in contrast with the verdicts of "guilty" against Germany and Austria-Hungary stand the verdicts acquitting England, Russia and France. Whoever, by overwhelming proof, converts the latter into their opposite, thereby also annuls the former verdicts of this "German" against his fatherland and against Austria-Hungary. It will therefore suffice to look into these "acquittals," which contrast with the unanimous "conviction" of all Germany—with the sole exception of this quasi-German. We begin with France, reminding the reader of all those accusing circumstances, which we have already presented, in referring to the attitude of Italy.

Two Heretics of France.

Let two unofficial French voices now familiarize us with the sentiments which were prevalent in those circles of educated France not under English domination at the time of the serious political crises of the years 1905 and 1911. They coincide almost entirely with those views—prevalent (as I have learned through the correspondence with French patriots that I have kept up for many years), during the years 1913 and in 1914 before the outbreak of the war—which recognized in the deliberate efforts on the part of the leading French politicians to make the German-French relations critical and, in France's growing dependence on those elements in Petersburg and London which made for war, a misfortune and a danger of everincreasing imminence.

Toward the end of the year 1906 appeared the book by

¹Indeed, it is characteristic that at every opportunity the "Accuser" parades his smatterings of French.

Emile Flourens. "La France conquise. Edward VII et Clémenceau." Flourens was foreign minister in the Goblet Ministry from December, 1886, to April 4, 1888, and was also a member of the later ministries of Rouvier and Tirard.

As deputy he always sat in the ranks of the moderate republicans. His book is a burning protest against the dependence on the English diplomacy in which Edward VII had placed the French by converting first Delcassé and then Clémenceau into tools for the attainment of his ends. Flourens reproaches the King with having, insofar as in his power lay, disturbed the good relations existing between Germany and Russia, in which he recognized a hostage to peace, and with using the remaining continental powers as pawns in order to checkmate Germany. The efforts of Emperor William to achieve closer relations with England he consciously frustrated, and finally succeeded in making Morocco the brand that lit the fires of dissension between France and Germany. And after the fall of Delcassé, says this writer, he made every effort, through Clémenceau, to turn France into a "soldier of England." No one could emphasize the aggressive tendency of the Franco-English combination directed against Germany, more strongly than Flourens does. And the Russian press, too, began, as far back as that, to put itself at the service of this policy. On the 17th of March, 1906, there appeared in the Petersburg "Russ" a Paris letter in which it was literally stated: "I learn from a reliable source that during his stay in Paris King Edward expressed the desire that a military convention be concluded between England and France. It is said that his wish was sympathetically received. The election of Clémenceau (Minister of the Interior in the Sarien Cabinet, President of the Ministry, November, 1906, to July, 1909) is agreeable to the Liberal English cabinet; it will result in bringing England and France still closer together. For his English sympathies are well known. The 'entente cordiale' beams ever brighter. And that, too, is what Sir Edward Grey has declared to his colleagues."

Nor were these Petersburg circles blind to the fact that closer relations between Russia and England through their French ally, were also set in motion by these events.

Nearly five years passed since Flourens had sounded his alarm in "La France conquise." It died away without the slightest effect. The advances England was making to France had in the meanwhile, taken on a more and more definite character. The sole protesting voice, raised by the "Eclair" every week in the Waverly Articles under the title "l'Angleterre inconnue," may have sharpened the political conscience of many a Frenchman, but since these articles were not only strictly Catholic in tendency, but also monarchistic in tone, an influence on the ruling group was out of the question.

Those who belonged to this group in France were, without exception, anti-clerical, and belonged to the Freemasons. "Grand Orient" at that time (1909) numbered 25,000 members, the "Grande Loge de France" 5,000, and the fact that King Edward was the head of the English Freemasons, who stood in the closest relations with their French and Italian brothers, helped very materially to increase the English influence in France. The Platonic connection of the German Free-masonry with these organizations, whose "humanity" was directed against backward Germany, resulted in a duping of the Germans similar to that which resulted from the fraternizing of the German Social Democrats with their "comrades" in England and France.

Now, it is very characteristic that England, which at the very time of the peace negotiations at Portsmouth renewed its alliance with Japan, was at the same time endeavoring to approach Russia again; and, above all things, to prevent the formation of more intimate relations between us and Russia, which had been feared since the meeting between Emperor William and the Czar at Björkö. After the great services which Germany had rendered its Russian neighbor during the Japanese war and during the Revolution, this combination most dreaded by England, appeared not improbable to those who had no conception of the fact that anti-German tendencies penetrated even to the immediate entourage of the Czar; and that the Russian intellectuals, always moving from one extreme to the other, were in process of converting their ideals of freedom into an unbridled nationalism.

Nor must it be overlooked that the Algeciras conference which passed off without destroying the world peace, led to that revolution in naval policy which, through the building of the first dreadnaught announced a new era in naval warfare.

The first success of English diplomacy in the direction of Russia was the agreement of the two powers on the division of Persia into spheres of influence at the end of August, 1907; this was designed above all else—so much is now certain, and the result has demonstrated it—to make of Persia the booty by means of which Russia should be led to an understanding with England over the great questions of European politics. The chain of intrigues which thenceforth were woven in Teheran, were always directed from the English side with a view to this end. The consequence was a forbearance (in questions that Great Britain had till then regarded as a *noli me tangere*), which did not lack a certain comic aspect, and which was masterfully taken advantage of by Hartwig the Russian envoy to Persia at that time.

There followed the great crisis of the year 1908. It was

this very year which seemed to all the friends of peace to promise the best prospects for the future. In Berlin a committee was formed for the creation of more friendly relations between the French and Germans; the boundary difficulties between German and French Camerun were adjusted by a treaty; the North Sea and Baltic Treaty guaranteed to the powers that had possessions on the coasts their status; and it could be taken as a sign of growing confidence in the final disappearance of the campaign against Germany which had principally been carried on by the English press, that in May and June South German burgomasters first, then 130 German pastors paid a visit to England, and found there a hospitable, and, in part, an enthusiastically friendly reception.

Parallel with these things, to be sure, were symptoms which could not help but be disquieting. Agents, led by an English Balkan Committee, at whose head stood the member of Parliament, Noël Buxton, arranged for a Bulgarian-Turkish war, and in May it became known that King Edward VII was about to pay the Czar a visit. The previous conference of the King with Clémenceau and Pichon at Biarritz had been disquieting enough. Against his journey to Russia a protest was made in the House of Commons by 57 Radicals, because they viewed with distrust, and not without reason, the meddling of the King in world politics. The protest was defeated by a great majority; but what sort of hopes the enemies of Germany were pinning to this journey was shown by an article in the "Golos Moskwy" (of May 31, 1908) which, as the organ of Gutschkow at that time reflected the opinions of very powerful circles. The visit of Edward VII was destined, it was said, to lead up to a Russian-English alliance. "If it is assumed that this alliance will become a reality, and will direct its point against Germany, the latter's position would certainly be most difficult. Pressed back, from the west and the east, by the armies of Russia and France, cut off from the sea by the English fleet, it would fall into difficulties from which a way out could hardly be found. The pictures of Europe's political life change from day to day, and perhaps we shall witness the realization of that grandiose plan of Edward VII whose final aim is the peaceful isolation of Germany."

The use of the word "peaceful" was conscious hypocrisy, for even then the Russians wanted war, but out of consideration for the Czar, who could not be initiated into the ultimate aims of the great conspiracy which was preparing, an attempt was made to keep alive in the public mind the notion that, in the face of the powerful combination of England, Russia and France we would, without a struggle, submit to the dictates of the Three, and that each of them would, without much expense, arrive at the goal of their

desires:—the possession of Constantinople and the Dardanelles by Russia, the reincorporation of Alsace Lorraine by France and the capture of the German fleet by England.

The leading politicians of the three powers were not so optimistic in their reckonings; they knew that it would not pass off without a struggle. When, on June 9th, King Edward met the Czar off Reval, he took with him Sir Charles Hardinge, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, and Nicolson; Iswolski, Stolypin and two secretaries of state accompanied the Czar. What it was that Czar and King discussed has not become known, and was probably of no great consequence, but Hardinge and Iswolski assuredly came to an understanding as to their plans for the future. By word of mouth, only—in strict pursuance of the consistent general instruction of Grey; but the result of the negotiations was communicated to the diplomatic representatives of England and Russia, and later came, circuitously, to our knowledge. Iswolski declared himself ready to proceed with England against Germany, as soon as Russia should have sufficiently strengthened itself in a military way. Six to eight years was the longest period contemplated for this purpose, that is to say, till between the years 1914 and 1916. As long as Clémenceau remained in office, it could be reckoned on that France would, under all circumstances join in. A rather long period of military preparations for the three powers was, of course, contemplated.

Furthermore an agitation was begun in England immediately after the days at Reval for the concentration of the channel fleet in the North Sea. There appeared that book of Percival A. Hislam which caused such a stir, "The Admiralty of the Atlantic"; in Russia the Imperial Council approved the four armored cruisers voted down by the Duma; England and Russia entered with fresh energy on a movement for reforms in Macedonia; and the English fleet manoeuvres between the Channel Fleet and the Home Fleet in the North Sea, close to our borders, already bore the character of a demonstration, not to say of a threat. This impression was increased by the visit which the President of the French Republic paid to the Czar in Reval at the end of July. Fallières took with him Clémenceau and his foreign minister, Pichon. There followed shortly afterwards in Ischl a meeting of King Edward with Emperor Francis Joseph, whom, as later became known, the King endeavored to introduce into his political constellation, an endeavor that was notoriously unsuccessful. To this chain of machinations there belongs the final fact, that King Edward conferred on August 25th at Marienbad with Clémenceau and Iswolski.

Meanwhile the fruits of the English agitation in Bulgaria had ripened to such an extent that a Bulgarian-Turkish war

seemed unavoidable, and there seemed every likelihood that a partition of Turkey would be the result, and that the great powers immediately interested, Austria, Russia and England would profit thereby. Russia had since May, 1908, been engaging in negotiations with Austria, which, proceeding from the question of the building of a railroad in the Balkans and on the Adriatic Sea, led up finally to Russia's being ready to adopt a favorable attitude toward the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; in return for which Austria promised to take her troops out of the Sandschak Nowibazar directly after the annexation had been proclaimed. Austria furthermore declared itself ready to enter into a confidential exchange of opinions with Russia concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles. That was the agreement arrived at on the 27th of August between Aehrenthal and Iswolski at Buchlau and Sömerang.

It is not definitely known how Turkey got word of this agreement. It is certain that she regarded the meetings at Reval with the greatest distrust, and highly probable that the Young Turks in Paris also got wind of further plans. The Revolution of July 24, 1908, and the proclamation of the Turkish constitution was the countermove, and had, as a direct consequence, that England went over, with flying colors, into the camp of "parliamentary" Turkey. Thus began a new stage of the oriental question, which was introduced by the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria, by the acceptance of the title of Czar by Ferdinand, and by the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and which led to a serious European crisis which reached its highest point in March, 1909.

Since, in the meanwhile, it had become clear that England had no inclination to allow the question of Constantinople and the Dardanelles to be taken up, Iswolski was seized by the notion that he had been duped in Buchlau by Aehrenthal. His hate was directed against his Austrian fellow-diplomat; Russia identified itself with the Servian claims, and that led to a diplomatic campaign which came near ending in a European war, and was accompanied by a press campaign of almost unexampled bitterness. It was, moreover, directed not only against Austria-Hungary, but also against Germany. Russia, England, France, and even Italy (in spite of the fact that Tittoni had been kept informed by Iswolski of the negotiations at Buchlau) raised protests against the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. A royal council in Vienna decided on the 17th of March to call in the reserves, a Russian-Austrian war seemed inevitable; when finally, on the 25th of March, 1909, Russia condescended to recognize, without reserve, the annexed territory as part of the Habsburg monarchy.

England's Panic of 1909.

On the German side this campaign was led by Kiderlen-Wächter. He prevented the annexation question from being dragged on to the forum of an international conference; our emperor left no room for doubt that Germany considered itself bound by its treaty obligations in case of a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary, and finally brought it about that all the powers recognized the annexation and renounced the idea of a conference. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, muttered resentfully. It has become known that he reproached the Petersburg cabinet very emphatically because of its attitude which had, in effect, been peaceful. It was not he, however, but Kiderlen, who carried the day. That was to be rated the more highly, as he simultaneously brought to a happy conclusion (by the agreement of February 9th) the Moroccan question which had again been brought to a head through the Casablanca conflict. Despite all this, and although the attitude of Germany had been in all points loyal and correct, the hate of England and Russia was especially directed against us. In England it took the form of a panic lasting from February to June, 1909, was caused by the invention of the airship by Count Zeppelin, brought with it a veritable orgy of passionate attacks through the press, and aimed at the annihilation of the German fleet.

"Two weeks, perhaps two days"—wrote the "Standard" at that time—"would suffice to destroy the Kaiser's sea power, and once that is removed from the world, the peace of Europe is assured." The "Morning Post" said: "We are still in a position to destroy the German war fleet and to ruin completely the enormous and increasing German commerce. But if we let things go on until 1912, the advantage will be on the German side!" At that time "Nineteenth Century," "Fortnightly Review," "National Review" wrote, and English statesmen such as Admiral Fitzgerald and Lord Charles Beresford spoke in the same spirit, sometimes in tones even more poisonous. It was really as though the whole nation had for the time lost its senses and all feeling for its own dignity.

But eventually the excited temperament of these "Insulars" wore itself out, and there occurred, as in England so often happens, a sudden change of sentiment. As early as the end of 1908 a member of Parliament, Mr. H. Sidebotham, had pointed out, in the Reform Club at Manchester, that the constant interference of the King in foreign politics was no longer to be endured. In June, 1909, a visit of English clergymen to Berlin showed that it was already possible to escape from the general suggestion. A few days later a meeting of the Czar with Emperor William

took place, and the table talk which was exchanged on that occasion permitted the conclusion that Russia would not allow herself to be used as an ally of the French "Revenge" or of the English politic of panic.

Finally came the fall of the Clémenceau Ministry, and the new Briand Ministry appeared to look with little favor on the plans which the English had by no means abandoned; so that a fresh meeting of Edward VII with Clémenceau at Marienbad made an almost funeral impression. The campaign at Racconigi in October was Iswolski's last important act as foreign minister. At the end of the year he was appointed member of the Imperial Council. The Russian press had attacked him violently, and the Czar looked about for his successor. Negotiations with Ssas-sow, the Russian ambassador at Rome, for the taking over of the ministry, had already begun several months before; yet they did not, until October, 1910, reach their conclusion, which resulted in Iswolski's transfer to Paris, where he was thenceforth the centre of all the efforts to influence public opinion against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and, in particular, exercised a most pernicious influence by bribing the Paris press, already anti-German enough. There can be no doubt that his bitter hatred of Aehrenthal was one of the springs of his activity.

The year 1910 then passed through contradictory political currents. The English electoral campaign, whose result seemed to assure the Liberal cabinet its position for a long time to come, was conducted by means of a barefaced misuse of the watchword: an "Imminent German Peril." In London and Petersburg an agitation was started for the withdrawal of English and Russian deposits in Germany, the Delcasséan tendencies again won ground, and the storm which had been brewing since February on the Balkan Peninsula increased the political nervousness. There were, however, side by side with the voices which urged a strengthening of the English armed forces, through the introduction of universal compulsory service, others which made themselves heard, these, in view of the ever more threatening recurring danger of a universal war, preached reconciliation. In the "Empire Review" Edward Dicey wrote: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured, but if the two nations fall out, it will be a most unhappy day for mankind." In the "Semschtschina," a respectable journalist, Glinka, championed the view that it would be madness for Russia to decide for England if it were a question of choosing between England and Germany. And as to France, my political friends there wrote me that the public opinion of the country wished to preserve peace, and was resolved not to go with England.

Such was the situation when on May 6, 1910, King Edward died and with George V a personality took hold of the rudder who had till then stood aloof from politics and as to whose pacific sentiments there was the less doubt in Germany as the King stood in the best of personal relations to his Imperial cousin. The journey of Emperor William to London for the funeral of Edward VII seemed to have strengthened these friendly relations still more. But it was worth bearing in mind that the "Temps," in the obituary dedicated to Edward VII, expressly admitted that the King carried through the Anglo-French Entente over the heads of both governments, and that at that time the same paper was protesting violently against the dislodging of the Russian troops along the German and Austrian frontiers. Unfortunately it was these hostile voices, and not the peaceful elements, which possessed the decisive influence. King George was as little of an independent political reality as Nicholas II. Just as the latter was not able to bring more than temporary opposition to bear against chauvinistic influences, and was under the thumb of the war party led by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolajewitch¹, so George V was unable to escape the influence of the three men who carried on the traditions of Edward VII: Asquith, Grey, Churchill. The visit of Nicolas II, with his new foreign minister Ssassonow, at Potsdam, and the Potsdam treaty of November 4, 1911, resulted, as a matter of fact, only in the semblance of an improvement in the German-Russian relations. Ssassonow, after his return to Petersburg, deliberately put the contents of the treaty before the Russian public in a false light, when he declared to the "Nowoje Wremja" that Germany had renounced all interest in Balkan politics. That was the more conscientiousless, as at that very time a new crisis was in preparation both in Morocco and in the Balkans.

Francis Delaisi's "La Guerre Qui Vient."

About this time there appeared in Paris a companion piece to "La France conquise" by Flourens, the brochure by Francis Delaisi, "La guerre qui vient." It reached the bookshops in May, 1911, but was at once bought up and destroyed by the French government. There was too much dangerous truth presented by Delaisi to the limited understanding of the common herd of the French, and so this insignificant bit of writing passed practically unnoticed. But a copy of it was retained in Switzerland, and in 1914,

¹Princess Militza of Montenegro, wife of the Grand Duke Peter Nikolajewitch, worked in the same direction. To the war party there also belonged the notorious leader-writer of the "Nowoje Wremja," Pilenko, the Czarina Mother, and Izwolski, who, by his settling in Paris, had gained even greater influence.

after the outbreak of the war, there appeared a new edition, to which we owe our knowledge of one of the most remarkable bits of political soothsaying.

Delaisi is a socialist, and became known through two earlier books, "La force allemande," "La Démocratie et les Financiers," of which only the titles are known to me. "La guerre qui vient," however, indicates that he is a man who really has something to say. The picture he draws of the world war which he expected and would, if in any way possible, have liked to prevent, bears an astonishing likeness to the reality that we are today experiencing. Delaisi perceived quite correctly in May, 1911, that England was about to repeat the "coup" of 1905—that is to say, the shoving of France into the Moroccan adventure. He declared that Delcassé became member of this Monis Ministry, as minister of Marine, in order to conclude a military convention which was calculated to bind France to England permanently. For the Island Kingdom, conquered on the industrial field, had resolved to take up arms. The policy of isolation, said Delaisi, which began in 1903 with the journeys of Edward VII, was now completed: France was won through Morocco, Russia through the sacrifice of Persia, Italy was being led to defection from its allies by the offer of Tripoli and Albania, and through the encouragement of the Young Turks, the friend of Germany, Abdul Hammid, had successfully been put out of the way. England had been building up her fleet of dreadnaughts since 1905. He pointed out that the former naval base at Plymouth, directed against France, had now given place to Dover and Rosyth, from whose fortified harbors the German war fleet was to be destroyed and German commerce once for all put an end to. The British colonies had already been drawn into participation in this patriotic work. There could be no doubt of it—England meant to return to her old corsair tactics and to the system of blockading the continent. The naval manoeuvres of 1909 and 1910 were, he said, a sort of dress-rehearsal, and the consternation was immense when the fleet that represented the enemy succeeded in escaping through the Channel undamaged. But even assuming that England could succeed in carrying out her plan of blocking the mouth of the Weser and of the Elbe, and to capture off the north coast of Scotland or the Channel every merchant ship returning to Germany, the final goal, he declared, would not have been reached. Germany could conduct her ships lying in foreign harbors to Rotterdam and Antwerp under neutral flag, and so keep its commerce alive. For that reason England meant to blockade the Schelde as well, and, since the cannon of Flushing command the entrance, she must

prevent the fortifications of city and harbor that were planned, by bringing powerful pressure to bear on Holland. From all this it follows that Antwerp would have to become the objective in the struggle. England could only triumph if it closed up Antwerp; Germany could only maintain itself if it held this harbor open.

Delaisi then assumes that, Germany, foreseeing the imminent peril, will concentrate its fleet off Flushing, and simultaneously direct an army corps against Antwerp, whereupon there would be nothing left for the English, but to land troops in Belgium and throw the Prussians back across the Meuse and the Rhine.

He pointed out that Kitchener had already said: "The frontier of the British Empire in Europe is not the Pas de Calais, but the line of the Meuse." But to land troops one must be master of an army that can measure itself against the German, and that explains how the cry for universal compulsory military service could be raised in England. But as it met with no response, the eyes of the English turned toward France. "We have," they said, "not enough soldiers, but France has soldiers. Over there, across the Pas de Calais, there is a large, well-schooled and disciplined army; it is well armed and able to defy the Germans. The French are brave and warlike; they love war, and understand how to wage it. When the grand phrases 'honneur national,' 'intérêts supérieurs de la Patrie et de la civilisation,' are whispered to them, then they will march forward. We must therefore try to get the French army for ourselves."

"That cannot be very difficult. The French democracy is merely an outward appearance. This people is in reality ruled by an oligarchy of financiers and owners of iron foundries, upon whom press and politicians are dependent. We will deal with these persons, promise them a large war loan, through which their banks will receive large commissions, we will pledge ourselves to give them the chance to construct a few railways in Turkey, or to provide them with big enterprises in Syria, Ethiopia or in Morocco.

"For a few millions they will sell us the whole French army."

Thus did these good people think the matter out; and their wire-pullers got to work.

As early as 1903, when the war for the Transvaal had scarcely been liquidated, Edward VII arrived in Paris, and all the dear boobies who had yelled so loud, "Long live Kruger," now learned, through the press that they must shout "Vive l'Angleterre."

To reward us, the London cabinet magnanimously gave us, in return for Egypt, whose financial supervision be-

longed to us, Morocco, which did not belong to England. And at all the banquets one toasted the Entente cordiale.

But that did not suffice.

As Delcassé, who in 1905 wanted to force us into a war with Germany, was overthrown, England understood that it was necessary to be wary. She waited until the friend and messmate of Edward VII again came to power. He became—accidentally as it were—Minister of Marine, and —also as if by accident—it was announced, directly before his appointment, that negotiations were being taken up between London and Paris concerning a military agreement.

"Naturally this agreement is to be 'defensive.' But how easy will it be for the British government to force Germany to a declaration of war by the blockading of Antwerp!"

"And then we, the French, will march into the lowlands of Belgium and get broken heads, not for the King of Prussia, but this time for the King of England."

The question of how the French people, which wished for nothing more ardently than the maintenance of peace, are to be dragged into the war arranged by England is, says Delaisi, easy to answer. For the plan is already finished, and may any day be put into practice. The military convention at present being negotiated provides that in case of war the British fleet shall protect the French coasts, while the French army shall proceed against Antwerp. In order to move the French peasants to go freely into the field, it will be impressed upon them that the Prussians wake up every morning with the thought of marching into France. The venal press will exaggerate every disturbance (*vide Nancy!*) until the idea of a German peril shall have taken fast root. Then when some fine day the English fleets set themselves in motion, and German troops advance simultaneously toward Antwerp, it will be said that the neutrality of Belgium has been violated, and the Prussian army is advancing against Lille.

Here we discontinue our report on the leading ideas of Delaisi. He considered it possible for France to remain neutral in a German-English war, if it would refuse to lend the English its troops and to lend us the money which we would need for our preparations for war. The former would have been quite sufficient to preserve peace, for without French help England would not have dared to make war, and as to Germany's need of French money, that was illusion. It was a widely-spread superstition, which has only just disappeared. But Delaisi certainly saw truly, when he recognized the danger that threatened Europe in the determination of England to keep world politics under all

circumstances on paths which must inevitably lead to a break with Germany. That Delaisi did not include the Russian factor in his reckonings was due to the situation at that time. In the year 1911 it was believed in London that Morocco would have to be chosen as the point of attack, and that as soon as France had bound itself the participation of Russia would follow of itself, by virtue of the Alliance Franco-Russe.

General Monier's March on Fez in 1911.

There can be no doubt that Sir Edward Grey had already been instructed by France concerning the intended March on Fez, when General Monier informed him on the 25th of April, 1911, that he would undertake it; and it is equally certain that the incompatibility of the French enterprise with the stipulations of the documents of Algeciras was well known to him. The "North German Public Gazette" had, moreover, on the 30th of April pointed out that a breach of these stipulations would lead to incalculable consequences. But these very consequences were desired by England and France. The press of both countries again went to work to excite public sentiment against Germany. In France the acceptance of a constitution for Alsace-Lorraine was turned into grist for this mill. In England, during the visit of Emperor William, who attended the unveiling of the monument to Queen Victoria, this campaign was temporarily suspended and the Kaiser even honored as a guest of whom England was proud. But directly after his departure the campaign was taken up again; and even during Emperor William's stay in London Grey explained to our ambassador, Metternich, that the agreements made between England and France placed on England the obligation to support France even in case of the occupation of Fez lasting a long time; which admitted of no other interpretation than that England conceded to France the right to annex Morocco by degrees, and was determined to support her in this by force of arms. France's proceeding in Morocco in breach of her agreements met only with approval, although the Englishmen who had emigrated to Morocco stood diametrically opposed to the French policy of exploitation and annexation—certainly a proof that the English government was not following its own interests in this matter. It had only stipulated with France in advance that fortifications of the coast might not, in consequence of the accession of Morocco, remain in French or Spanish hands. It was therefore the more readily offended when the appearance of the "Panther" at Agadir gave proof that Germany did not mean to permit its treaty rights to be ignored.

The English fleet destined for Norway was called back to

Portsmouth, and the whole expeditionary force was also set in readiness. Our general staff received reports from its agents which described the seriousness of the situation. They referred to England's intention to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen in case of war. Thus our military attaché in Berne reported on the basis of absolutely reliable reports that the landing of English troops in Belgium in the course of the summer, had been immediately impending. It was also suspicious in the highest degree that at that time the journeys of the French General Staff and the manoeuvres of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th cavalry divisions took place exclusively on the Belgian border. Asquith and Lloyd George made in their speeches no secret of the fact that they held a participation of England in the conflict unavoidable. A new situation, said the prime minister, had arisen in Morocco. England would fulfill its treaty obligations towards France, which were, he said, well known to the Chamber; and Lloyd George declared in a speech which he held in the Mansion House: "If a situation is forced upon us in which peace can only be maintained through the surrender of the great and beneficent position which England has secured, then peace at any price would be intolerable humiliation."

But what most irritated Sir Edward Grey was that the plan conceived by the French Foreign Minister, de Selves: to answer the sending of the "Panther" with a French-English naval demonstration of Agadir, was, in consequence of Caillaux' opposition shipwrecked in the English cabinet, which, originally, had not shown itself averse to entering into this dangerous proposition.

Through the revelations of Faber, the extremely critical situation in July, 1911, was later made thoroughly known¹ and no one in England was in a position to rebuke him for the facts he presented, on the ground that they were lies. Not until the German-French treaty of November 4th, was the crisis relieved. It had among other things led to England's renewal for another ten years of its offensive and defensive treaty with Japan on the 13th of July, 1911, that is to say practically four years before its expiration, obviously it was done with a view to making sure of its ally in the East against Germany even in case the war toward which the English statesmen were working should break out until after August 1, 1915, or should not be settled by that time.

It was no thanks to Asquith and Grey that the peace was

¹On Dec. 21st, 1911, there was published in the Leipzig Illustrated Gazette, a map which showed the position of the English and the German fleet on July 24, August 19, and September 18. Those were the days on which a pouncing upon our fleet with superior forces was being considered. As early as September the English officers were informed of their marching goals on the continent.

ultimately maintained in spite of everything. As the stormy waves of the Moroccan conflict began to settle, a tendency again made itself felt in England which was in sharp opposition to the policy of the cabinet. They had experienced the uncanny feeling of standing at the edge of an abyss and of being dragged against their will into a war in which no English interests whatever were at stake. On sober second thought it became evident that the artfully cultivated bitterness against Germany could not be referred to any harm that England had suffered through us, but had been kindled by pointing out future possibilities which were said to threaten the world position of England.

Against the consciencelessness of this effort, ever louder protests were now raised from the members of the rank and file of the cabinet party. The Orientalist, Edward Granville Browne, complained that the English foreign policy had never been so secret, so lacking in straightforwardness, and so inaccessible to any kind of criticism; that it was more autocratic than in Russia. "We risk"—he wrote—"a war with Germany, that France may seize unfortunate Morocco; we lay ourselves open to the ridicule of our enemies and the pity of our friends by our obsequiousness to Russia; we estrange the confidence of Islam by our policy in Persia, in Turkey and in Morocco, and as to Tripoli we are at least open to suspicion."

Great liberal papers and weeklies such as "Manchester Guardian," "Daily Graphic," "Economist" emphatically pointed out that it was a mistake of the English policy to place itself in systematic opposition to the vital interests of Germany, that an entente with Germany would much better correspond, from every point of view, with the highest interests of England. The policy which followed the opposite goal was, they declared, "stupid and unbusinesslike." The "open letter about the foreign policy 1904-1911"—which such balanced and respected publicists as Morel and Hirst signed with their initials, was a deadly accusation against the leader of the English policies. But it was dismissed by Sir Edward Grey with the declaration that England was determined to continue its relations in their existing form with France and Russia; which, however, meant nothing else than that it would proceed with his system of political preparations for a war against Germany, and would protect its comrades of the Entente even if, in contempt of existing treaties, they violated the rights of other powers. A Paris telegram to the "Journal de Genève" published the following striking commentary on it: "Sir Edward Grey has declared that there exist between France and England no pledges other than those which have already been made public. From this the conclusion has been drawn that no military conventions exist between the two states. That is quite correct; but

from this it is not to be deduced that England and France have never considered the possibility of uniting their military forces."

The exact facts of the matter are these: Each time that a war seemed more or less imminent, the two governments entered into a consultation and promised for a limited period of time to support each other with their military power. That was the case in the summer of 1905, as it was at the time of the Casablanca affair. In the course of this year, however, the entente cordiale had become so plain an instrument, that each time that the circumstances seemed to demand it, a military arrangement was concluded by word of mouth, which was to be binding for the duration of the crisis, and which led to the exchange of very definite views as to how the armed forces of the two nations were to be employed.

On December 21, the "Daily Chronicle" wrote that if the policies of England were guided by public opinion, a German-English understanding would be the work of the near future. At no time had the great mass of the English people been filled with more upright sentiments toward Germany than now! Very similar was what appeared in the "Nation" of December 30: The time is ripe, it was said, to seek an understanding with Germany on the basis of real interests in Turkey and in Africa. "Agreements made now would put an end to the ruinous rivalry as to fleets, re-establish the European concert, and free us from the humiliating dependence on Russia."

Lord Haldane's Benevolent Journey.

Under such auspices began the year 1912. In France on the 13th of January, after the fall of Caillaux, it brought the "great" Poincaré Ministry to the helm, which had as an immediate consequence a fresh and violent outbreak of chauvinistic propaganda for "Revenge." The thing was so striking that as early as April the "Saturday Review" found it necessary to direct a serious note of warning at Paris: No one in England should overlook, it said, that chauvinism was ever on the increase in the French people, that the French government was taking care to keep it alive, and that a part of the French press thoroughly approved of this movement. The intention, it went on to say, of organizing a campaign whose purpose was to accustom the English to the idea that the moment had come for putting forth a great effort in an attempt to win back Alsace and Lorraine, was very generally recognized. It was generally assumed that it was England's mission to co-operate in this as France's second, and they wanted to inoculate, so to speak, the public opinion of England with this idea. It would

however be good if they knew in England that France had already embraced a firm decision.

To the liberal circles of England this attitude of France was entirely unpleasing, since the English government, under pressure of the tendencies above cited making for an understanding with Germany, had brought itself to the decision to send Lord Haldane to Berlin, ostensibly to initiate an understanding, in reality to reconnoitre and to procure fresh arguments for the existing fixed policy of the cabinet. The "Accuser" can read up on the results of the Haldane Mission (February 8-11, 1912) in my study on "How England Prevented an Understanding with Germany." It has now also been published in English: The New York Times Current History. The European War. Vol. II, July, 1915. Lord Haldane recently referred, in a speech delivered July 5, 1915, at the Liberal Club in London, to his Berlin negotiations. But naturally the failure of the "understanding" is not ascribed to the fact that England in the most definite manner refused to consent to a neutral attitude in case of war, but that the gilt is shifted upon the German "War Party," whom he was unable to deprive of their fixed idea.

"I gave myself no headache over Belgium and France. I rather recognized that England fights for its existence, and never doubted in the least that its participation in the war is an imperative necessity . . . In the year 1912," he said, "we were informed of the alarming condition of affairs; the press and the public knew it, too, and to me fell the task of establishing the details. After I had informed my colleagues of what I had discovered, we decided to act at once. McKenna began by increasing the fleet, and Churchill made it twice as strong as the German."

This acknowledgment of Haldane's is exceedingly important because it throws light on the motives which have determined England's behavior, and particularly its foreign policy up to the outbreak of the war. It was a war policy, and an undertaking to promote everything which might, at the moment of the conflict which they had in view, be advantageous to the three powers conspiring against Germany.

That a break had not been provoked earlier, happened out of consideration for Russia, which was behindhand with its preparations for war, and could appeal to the fact that in the Reval negotiations a longer period had been set for it.

Directly after Haldane's return, Churchill delivered the notorious speech in which he declared the German fleet to be a luxury and the English a necessity. During May occurred the agitation for the concluding of an Anglo-French Alliance (Morning Post, Daily Graphic, Observer, Spectator) as a counter-move to the efforts of liberal papers for an understanding with Germany.

In July Englishmen and Frenchmen took part in the Sokol celebration at Prague, whose anti-German character revealed itself so clearly at the time. In August the "Temps" announced the concluding of the Russian-French naval convention, and added the remark that a startling new political arrangement was in question which would not be pointed against the Triple Alliance.—"Who still believes in that?"—but against Germany and Austria. The naval convention was, it was said, in the first place a Russo-Franco-Italian Balkan convention; the powers of the Triple Entente were already preparing for the Tripolitanian peace. The line of attack was perfectly clear; Italy, Russia, France and England on the one side, Austria-Hungary on the other, Turkey on the dissecting table!!!

To our ambassador, Count Pourtalès, Kokowzew denied, as late as August 7th, the existence of a Russian-French naval agreement; but when the news of it came out, he was not ready to contradict it.

In October, Lord Roberts held forth concerning the inevitability of a war with Germany, and soon after he declared that every great nation has a right to fall upon its neighbor if it has the power—a piece of cynicism which the "Nation" despatched with the remark that it set up a moral code for a pack of wolves. It was the same sentiment which was championed back in 1903 by Homer Lea when he advised the English to deal with the German fleet as they had long since dealt with the Danish and the Dutch, i. e., by a sudden surprise attack to capture or destroy it.

Grey did not neglect to send quieting assurance to Petersburg and Paris, where the reconnoitering expedition of Hal-dane had at first awakened solicitude. He explained that the initial impetus toward the negotiations had not come from England but from Germany. Correspondingly quieting explanations were sent by Russia to England and France when the meeting between Kaiser and Czar in Balticport (July 4) roused anxiety. In reality as the communiqué published by Ssassonow and the German Imperial Chancellor showed, everything remained as before. Even before this, the French had been informed that the 303 million roubles which had been demanded by the Douma for the fleet were destined to be used against Germany. The head of the Russian General Staff and the head of the Admiralty Staff stayed in Paris while Kokowzew and Ssassonow were negotiating with the Imperial Chancellor; and when, one month later, Poincaré came to Petersburg, England certainly had cause to dismiss all anxiety. The naval convention had been concluded just before this, and Russia had sent the future commander-in-chief, Nicolas Nicolajewitch, to France, in order to let him take part in the big French manoeuvres on Ger-

many's west frontier; and Poincaré received the promise that the Russian military forces should again be concentrated in the western provinces on the German and Austrian borders.

The Indiscretions of "Gil Blas."

It was not until a year later that the world learned through an indiscretion of "Gil Blas" what a price France had to pay for these concessions. Mr. Poincaré, who had already been fixed upon as the future president of the French Republic, was given to understand that stern events were to be expected and that, sooner or later, the Austrian question would lead to serious international complications. They also reminded him that at the time when the Russian-French Alliance was concluded, the three-year term of military service existed in France, and that the two-year service since introduced, meant a weakening of France. He received, moreover, the friendly warning that there was in Petersburg a party friendly to Germany which kept forever insisting that the French army was no match for the German, and that one of the Balkan powers which wanted to join the Russian-French Alliance, only hesitated because, compared with Germany, France did not seem to it strong enough.

The threat that lay in these observations was not to be misunderstood. In order to maintain the Franco-Russian Alliance, Poincaré pledged himself to put through the three-year compulsory service, and he was forced to consider himself lucky that the Russian government now promised, as a further quid pro quo, to devote the new French loan which had been assured to it to the building of strategic railways in the direction of the frontiers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Parallel with these preparations went the conspiracy in the Balkans led by Russia, from which was awaited the solution of the Oriental question and a new military organization, to be turned against Austria. At the end of March a treaty was concluded, under the Russian aegis, between Servia and Bulgaria, providing for their common defence and for the protection of their mutual interests in case of a disturbance of the status quo on the Balkan Peninsula, or in case a third power should undertake a sudden attack on either of the allied powers.¹ A secret clause pledged both states, before taking any active steps, to apply to Russia for its view of the matter. In connection with this treaty there were negotiations which dragged Montenegro and Greece also into the conspiracy (into the details of which we shall not enter here). But let this one thing

¹ The Bulgarian-Servian Treaty, together with the military convention of March 12, 1912, was published in the "Matin" of the 25th and 26th of November 1913.

² The fact that the Montenegrins had proceeded with their declaration of war against Turkey ten days before is to be explained by King Nikita's lack of discipline.

by expressly emphasized: as a result of the whole proceeding, the accession of the allied powers to the Triple Entente was expected, and France and England were let into the secret and that it was agreed that Nicolas II should act as supreme arbitrator of any disputes which the division of the Turkish territory which was to be conquered, might lead to.

When everything was in readiness, the negotiations at Ouchy which had been drawn out on purpose were brought to a conclusion. On the 18th of October, Turkey and Italy signed the treaty of peace, and so the Balkan war could begin, whose progress and vicissitudes we pass over as they are well known. Valuable for our purposes are the indiscretions of the Russian press and of the French which permit us to recognize what were the more far-reaching aims connected with this Balkan war-tragedy. In December, 1912, when a peace conference of the Balkan States was being held at Janina, and the quarrel over Saloniki began to be a cause of dissension between the Allies, the "Nowoje Wremja" set forth the following program disclosing those plans of Russia, which later revealed themselves in fact. The success of the Balkan states would result in the erecting of a new Slavic power on Austria's southern border, which would not be subordinated to the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, a power whose members would, without exception owe their existence to Russia, and would therefore instinctively turn their eyes toward the North, toward the kindred Russian Empire. That would mean for the future a close alliance in fact with Russia, and a rescue of the Southern Slavs from the Germanic peoples threatening them from the north; whereas Russia would be acquiring from the Balkan States the benefit that Austria, attacked from behind by an army of 500,000 Slavs, would be crippled as far as Russia is concerned, and the latter would find it possible to solve the problem of the Straits in its own way. It was therefore a fateful question, on which the future depended whether Russia would take advantage of the favorable situation. In Russia people were confident that the reorganization of the Russian army had made much more rapid and much greater advances than could have been predicted in the days of the Reval meeting.

That it was from now on only a question of finding an occasion for war, was also shown by the attitude of the "Temps" which was at that time inspired from Petersburg through its correspondence, and also directly from the Russian Embassy in Paris. On December 15, 1912, parallel with the above-mentioned arguments of the "Nowoje Wremja," this most poisonous and dangerous of anti-German boulevard sheets brought the news that the mobilization of Aus-

tria had forced Russia to take precautionary measures. It mentioned, in particular, that the transportation of freight on the railway lines of the southwest had been very materially cut down because of the unbroken demand for war material. Warsaw, it said, presented, because of the assembly of troops there in great numbers, an entirely unusual appearance. In all armories there was drilling, in order to train in the great mass of assembled recruits. No discharges were granted. In official circles preparations were proceeding, unannounced, but not denied, while in the circles of the military a war with Austria was discussed as a thing inevitable. Russia itself (this article went on to say) would have to seize the favorable moment and strike the first blow that very winter. All Russia had familiarized itself with the prospect of the Austrian war.

The further developments were in the following direction: toward the end of the year (on December 4, 1912) a truce was concluded between the three allied Balkan states and Turkey, and in London a peace conference was held whose outcome showed that these allies were in their heart of hearts enemies. They were able once more to issue a common ultimatum to Turkey and again take up the war, but then came the turning point: the coup d'état of Enver Pasha, the quarrel about Adrianople and Scutari, the reconquest of Adrianople by the Turks, and then the quarrel between the allies for the booty, which led to the defeat of Bulgaria, to the peace of Bucharest, and finally to the conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and Turkey (October 12, 1913). All this created an entirely new political situation, whose various phases became of decisive influence upon the great conspiracy directed against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In France Poincaré had in the meanwhile been elected president of the Republic. On the 18th of February he celebrated his entrance into the Elysée. The Czar honored him with a congratulatory telegram, a distinction that had not been allotted to any of his predecessors, but the Paris bourse answered the vainglorious message of the president with a slump in the market, for it recognized quite rightly that France had received a war president. Delcassé was appointed Ambassador at Petersburg. His instructions were, to turn the Franco-Russian defensive alliance into a defensive and offensive alliance. Therewith began the enormous agitation for the introduction of the three year compulsory service, and at the same time, the endeavor to inoculate the public opinion of France with the idea that the conflict between Servia and Austria which was at the time becoming ever more critical was not to be taken tragically, since a danger to peace would exist only in case the powers of the

Triple Entente regarded the Austrian threats, which "could not be followed by any act" as anything more than a bluff.

Slav Banquets and Mobilization.

In Russia they thought otherwise. In January the Petersburg cabinet had already declared to Turkey that in case of a recurrence of the war Russia could not guarantee its neutrality. The Minister of War Ssuchomlinow had expressed himself to an editor of the "*Temps*" to the effect that the military situation of Russia was excellent,—obviously in order to put an end to the doubts as to the readiness of the Czar's empire for war, which were at that time beginning to find utterance in Paris. In Petersburg Slav dinners and Slav banquets were held, which, in view of a possible conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia championed, in more and more ardent tones, the watchword—"Away with all concessions, and forward to war!" At the end of January five Russian army corps were mobilized and stationed under the command of General Rennenkampf with its headquarters at Wilna. Parallel with this went a poisonous instigation of attacks directed against the German colonists in the western and southwestern provinces, while the Russian diplomacy at the same time bent all efforts to drag Roumania, which by binding treaties belonged to the Triple Alliance, over into the Russian camp.

Particularly noteworthy was the third of the Slavic banquets on February 19, 1913. It had concluded the resolution which it sent to the Czar by telegraph with the words: "**We understand that it is not compatible with the dignity and the interests of Russia to yield to Austria-Hungary or to protect Turkey against complete destruction,**" and thereupon received the thanks of the Czar for the sentiments "expressed by the participants at the Slavic Banquet in regard to their Slavic brothers." This imperial answer caused a tremendous sensation. It was interpreted as a repudiation of the endeavors toward an understanding on the Balkan questions which had at that time been set on foot by Austria through Count Hohenlohe, and led to immoderate attacks by the press on Austria, which was declared to stand on the verge of economic, financial and military collapse, whereas the Russian diplomacy "has at its service a powerful empire of inexhaustible vital energy, a great army which is eagerly longing to restore its glory and the **unreserved support of two great powers**, and, added to all this, the heroic league of the Balkan peoples." So sure did they feel themselves of the cooperation of the great anti-Austrian coalition, which was naturally also regarded as an anti-German one.

About this time, at the beginnig of March, the Czar convened a council of ministers in the Winter Palace in order to decide the question of peace or war. The result of this conference was communicated by himself to the gentlemen of his immediate entourage. "We shall"—he said—"have no war. Ssuchomlinow Ssassonow and Kokowzew say that we need 5-6 years more in order to be prepared."¹ The result of this recognition was that there took place an understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia concerning a lessening in the number of their border troops, and by the middle of May the danger of war could be looked upon as eliminated. All the more lively became the agitation in the press and at the Slavic celebrations in Petersburg, as well as the echo which these voices found in Moscow. A great Moscow paper argued that the existence of Austria-Hungary was useful to nobody, but was on the contrary harmful to the whole world. A "decent winding up of the affairs of this new political corpse" they declared to be irremissible. A Petersburg letter to the "*Journal des Débats*" simultaneously declared that even the peacefully minded regretted that the crisis had not been settled by a war.

How seriously this mood of the public mind of Russia, at the and of the persons standing at the back of it and urging it on toward war, was regarded among us, was shown by the unanimous passing of our military budget on the 30th of June. It could not be supposed that that very spacious term of five to six years for Russia to prepare completely for war, would be strictly adhered to. The time had obviously been set so far off, only in order to quiet the Czar, who did not like decisions close at hand. As a new factor there was added the fear that the discontent over the reactionary and despotic policy of the Russian government might lead to a second revolution. Its probably very imminent outbreak was reported to me in October, 1913, with great positiveness by a person close to those with whom the final decision rested. The consequence of this apprehension was that, under pressure of the Slavophile influences and in view of the anxiety caused by the internal conditions of the empire, the Russian diplomacy showed itself extraordinarily nervous, and, in the affair of the military

¹ Probably Kokowzew had succeeded in moving his two colleagues to this declaration, which was in direct opposition to their previous position. He, the premier, was at that time being given much anxiety by the relations within the country. It was only after the lapse of a year, when the old Goremykin took Kokowzew's place, that the view prevailed that inner difficulties could be best overcome by a victorious foreign war. There was then no longer any talk about longer periods of time for the training of the army. And at the outbreak of the war it became evident that they considered themselves in every respect "archipret."

mission of General Liman von Sanders, "jostled" Germany—as one may well put it—so rudely that, except for the unusually conciliatory attitude of our diplomacy, it might have come to a break as early as that.

This whole movement of the Russian diplomacy was particularly striking in view of that decision at the March conference, and was the more noteworthy as it took place without any previous understanding with England and France. For the English, moreover, this procedure on the part of the Russians was particularly disagreeable as the Turkish fleet had been standing since June, 1912, under the command of the English Admiral Limpus, and as English firms (Armstrong-Vickers) had been busy with the reorganization of the Turkish wharves and marine arsenals at the Golden Horn. It is, then, very remarkable that at this very time Russia should have shown itself much less sensitive toward Austria. When in September and October Servia's game in Albania led to a new and dangerous Austro-Servian crisis, Servia, in view of the attitude of the official leaders of the Russian policies, had to submit to an Austrian ultimatum.

The explanation of this circumstance is to be found in the attitude assumed by France and England at that time. The new president of the French Republic made a tour of France for the purpose of creating sentiment for the carrying through of the three year compulsory service, while the French press, in harmony with the Unionistic sheets of England, agitated for universal compulsory service in England. Mr. Poincaré's trip to London bore the character of an inaugural visit, and took place in the hope of a return visit of King George to Paris. Finally the agreements concerning a great new Russian loan of $2\frac{1}{2}$ thousand millions of francs in France were completed, whereas a loan which was negotiated in Paris by Austria-Hungary was wrecked under Russian pressure, and every giving of financial support to Turkey was similarly prevented. It was an exceedingly noteworthy political game. They hoped in Paris on the one hand to separate Austria from Germany in spite of everything, and on the other hand, to prevent Turkey from joining the Triple Entente.

Anglo-French Naval Co-operation.

Even more involved was England's double game. The negotiations, which had for a long time hung fire with Germany, concerning the adjustment of their mutual interests in the Bagdad Railway district, and in Africa at Portugal's expense, were again taken up, and, with apparent sincerity, led very close to a conclusion, so that in September, 1913, an agreement seemed to be immediately at hand. That in this,

as in the negotiations for a naval convention, which were similarly renewed, there was only the deceptive appearance of reality, we know from those admissions of Haldane on July 5, 1915, which we have cited above. They were moves in the game of preparing for that "struggle for existence" which Haldane had, on his return from Berlin in February 1912, represented to his colleagues in the cabinet as inevitable.

Yet the visit of King George V, to Paris, where he arrived on April 21, 1915, accompanied by Sir Edward Grey,—who, on this occasion set foot for the first time in his life on the soil of the Continent—became of decisive significance. As to the course of this visit and its meaning, we are thoroughly informed, through the "Documents concerning the Outbreak of the War", Section 7 of the new German White Book. between England and France for cooperation at sea in case of war, that the English fleet would take over the protection of the North Sea, of the Channel, and of the Atlantic Ocean, in order to allow the French the possibility of concentrating their fleet in the western Mediterranean, where Malta would be put at their service as a point of support. The English Mediterranean fleet was then to come under the command of a French Admiral, the French torpedo boats and submarines were to be put to use in the Channel.

The same source informs us that in May, as a result of the visit of George V, it was proposed by France—along with a series of political questions which were taken up—that the existing military and political agreements between France and England be supplemented by corresponding agreements between England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey took up the proposal very sympathetically, but declared himself unable, without the consent of the cabinet, to give any binding answer.

It follows from later Paris reports dated July, —although the exact day is not mentioned—that the proposal of a Russian-English naval convention is to be traced back to Iswolski, who wanted to make the royal visit to Paris serve as a means of turning the Triple Entente into an alliance after the pattern of the Triple Alliance. Out of consideration for the English disinclination toward forming alliances, however, they gave up, for the immediate future, the carrying out of this larger plan and preferred to proceed step by step. And the report had now come in, that the English cabinet had, upon Grey's recommendation, agreed to the conclusion of a naval convention, and decided that the negotiations should take place in London between the English Admiralty and the Russian naval attaché Mr. Wolkow. The above

¹ First published in the "North German Public Gazette" of October 16, 1914.

authority cited in the White Book goes on to add that the satisfaction of the Russian and the French diplomacy over this new taking of the English politicians by surprise was great, and the conclusion of a formal alliance was held to be only a matter of time. Wolkow then went to Petersburg with the text of the Franco-English naval conventions, and soon was back in London with instructions for his negotiations.

What these instructions were is shown by a report proceeding very evidently from Petersburg which is based on the minutes, or possibly on an extract from the minutes, of a conference which was held on the 26th of May at the headquarters of the Chief of the Russian Admiralty Staff for the purpose of fixing on the basis of the negotiations with England. It is important enough to be given here in full:

"In consideration of the fact that an agreement between Russia and England concerning the cooperation of their naval forces in the case of war-like operations of Russia and England, participated in by France, is desired, the conference arrived at the following conclusions:

"The projected naval convention is to regulate the relations between the Russian and English armed forces at Sea in all particulars, which entails an understanding concerning signals and special codes, radio telegrams and the manner of communication between the Russian and English Naval Staffs. The two naval staffs shall, moreover, make reports to each other at regular intervals concerning the fleets of third powers, and concerning their own fleets, particularly as to technical data, as well as newly introduced machines and inventions. There shall also take place exchange of views at regular intervals between the Russian and the English Naval Staff, after the pattern provided by the Franco-Russian agreement, for the examination of questions which interest the two naval ministries. The Russian naval convention with England shall, like the Franco-Russian, make provision for previously agreed upon, but separate, actions of the Russian and English navies. As to strategic aims, a distinction is to be made between the naval operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea districts, on the one hand, and the prospective sea fights in the Mediterranean on the other. In both districts Russia must endeavor to receive compensation for relieving a part of the English fleet so that it can deal with the German fleet.

"In the Bosphorus and Dardanelles region, temporary

¹ I want to point out in this connection that to this end a system of espionage has been organized in Pomerania for years, and that a part of its membership has acquired property in Pomerania.

undertakings in the Straits, as strategic operations of Russia in case of war, shall be taken into consideration.

"The Russian interests in the Baltic demand that England retain as large a part of the German fleet as possible in the North Sea. The overwhelming numerical superiority of the German fleet over the Russian would thereby be done away with, and a Russian landing in Pomerania perhaps become possible.¹ In this connection the English government could perform a substantial service, if, before the beginning of warlike operations, it were to send a great number of merchant ships to the Baltic ports, that the shortage of Russian transport ships be made up.

"As far as the situation in the Mediterranean is concerned, it is of the highest importance for Russia that a certain preponderance of the Entente fleet over the Austro-Italian be secured. For, in case the Austro-Italian forces govern this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous blow to Russia. It must be assumed that the Austro-Italian forces preponderate over the French. England would therefore have to secure the majority of forces to the Entente powers, by despatching the necessary number of ships to the Mediterranean, at least so long as the development of the Russian navy has not proceeded far enough to assume the solution of this problem itself. Russian ships would have to be able to use with England's consent, English ports as a base in the eastern Mediterranean, just as the French naval convention permits the Russian fleet to use the French ports as a base in the western Mediterranean."

Through an indiscretion which appeared in the press, it became known that the negotiations of Wolkow with Prince Louis of Battenberg took place on the basis of these instructions. At that time he was First Lord of the Admiralty, today, as is well known, he is placed on the shelf as a "German."

Sir Edward Grey and the Naval Convention.

That England delayed the concluding of the naval convention longer than the Russians liked, so that eventually it could not be signed before the outbreak of the war, was due to the fact that at that very time the English press had become distrustful, and pointed particularly to the existing policies of Russia which stood in opposition to English interests in Persia and in India. Grey who was forced to deny, in Parliament, his relations to Russia, and simultaneously had to negotiate with Russia, fell into a very embarrassed situation. But he saved himself by bare-faced lying. On the 11th of June, he gave, when interpellated by Mr. King concerning the English-Russian naval convention,

the following information, according to the stenographic parliamentary report:

"The honorable member for North Somerset put a similar question last year in regard to land forces, and the honorable member for North Salford also put on that same day a similar question to the one he has again put today. The prime minister answered at that time that, if a war between the European powers breaks out, there exist no unpublished agreements which could limit or disturb the freedom of the government or of Parliament to decide on the question of whether England shall take part in a war. This answer covers both the questions which lie before me in writing. It remains just as true today as a year ago. No negotiations have been concluded with any power whatever since then which would make this assertion less true. No negotiations of that sort are in progress and it is, as far as I can judge, not likely that any are likely to be entered. But if any agreement were to be concluded which would make it necessary to withdraw the Prime Minister's declaration of last year, then it ought to, according to my opinion, and it would, I take it, be laid before Parliament."

Obviously Sir Edward Grey's left hand did not know what his right had done, and his "conscience" could, indeed, rest satisfied with the fact that nothing, to be sure, had been concluded, for the naval negotiations with Russia were still wavering in the balance, and he did not have to be officially aware of the fact that they were pending, since the whole matter had been given over to the First Lord of the Admiralty, at the suggestion, to be sure, of Sir Edward Grey. And finally the agreements with France, as they had been formulated in the letters of November, 1912, bore, pour sauver la face, a qualified character! That England, as a matter of fact, was bound hand and foot, was dependent on such decisions as Russia or France might choose to make, that had not been discovered nor could it even be surmised, by Parliament; it was known only to Grey, Asquith and the narrow circle of their confidants in the cabinet. Parliament also did not know that war with Germany had been decided on, on principle, since 1909, and that since then only the opportunity was being looked for to conduct it with the greatest possible certainty of success. In 1905, 1908, 1911, they believed themselves in England to be near the goal, and it did not lie with England that congresses and conferences and not the sword, decided the conflicts of that year. After that, however, English policy took the new direction of postponing the outbreak of the struggle, whose scope was rightly foreseen, until the Russian armaments and their own had increased so far as to assure the desired success. It was contemplated that the earliest date would be the year 1915,

until then every conflict must be avoided, and Germany be kept to the idea by means of negotiations concerning the pending problems: of the proportion of naval construction year; of naval celebration; African colonies; Bagdad Railway (that it had little to fear from England). As is well known, we held fast to this idea until the last moment. The game of Sir Edward Grey was luckily played. Now his cards lie before us, and we see that they are the cards of a professional card sharper.

Nor do they today in England avoid admitting this, or indeed, boasting about it. In the "Cologne Gazette" of July 11th of this year is published the letter of an Englishman to a Chilean which was given out in the "Gazeta Militar" a paper, appearing in Santiago de Chile. This letter, because of the "brutal frankness" with which it champions that "Morality for a pack of wolves" to which we above referred, deserves to be hung lower, as an important document of contemporary history.

"Germany"—so says the Englishman's letter—"had become a deadly poison for British trade. 'Made in Germany' was already an intolerable nightmare. Wherever an Englishman wanted to conclude a deal a German competitor came out victorious, and every manufactured article produced in England would run up against an equally good, or better article manufactured more cheaply in Germany. And not alone England suffered from the consequences of German cheapness; it had become a universal plague. France, Belgium and Russia had also to watch how their factories rapidly retrograded; they were flooded by German wares under such alarming circumstances that it cried to heaven. And it is a fact that it was in these countries, in Belgium particularly, rather than in England, that there arose the idea of an alliance to settle Germany's hash. Before the attack on Liege the Germans did not know how well Belgium was prepared, and today they still believe in its innocence."

"From the above you can gauge what more the future has in store for the poor German. I can assure you that no part of the program of this war was for England something unforeseen, and that, however, the fortunes of war may turn out, the result of the war will bring us profit and the business will bloom here as never before. All the Belgian factories have already disappeared; the industrial districts of France and Russia are laid waste by armies, Germany and Austria-Hungary will remain ruined, consequently, only the English factories will remain to supply the world, and if we can succeed in persuading Spain and Italy to take part in the struggle, these prospects would be even more complete. There are no grounds for getting excited over the ruin and the desolation that the war calls forth on the continent, for

the greater they are, the greater and the more positive will be the advantages for England."

To which the "Gazeta Militar" adds the remark: "The recipient of the above letter hands it over to the public as a sign of protest against the inhuman views it contains, and will send to its author, as his sole answer, the number of the 'Gazeta' in which it appears."

Here at last is a voice which openly acknowledges the motives of the men who made the war; after all the official hypocrisy, one sincere word.

We recommend it to the "Accuser," to purge him of the esteem in which he holds the disinterested love of peace of his English heroes. He has now received a picture of the actual preliminary history of the war, a piece of truth, insofar as it can today be confirmed, and insofar as it can be brought to light without damage to our interests. We shall not enter upon a polemic against his exposition of the official publications of the material that refers to the time between the murder of the archduke and the outbreak of the war. He was, to say the least, exceedingly uncritical and unscientific in his treatment of those diplomatic despatches which were published by the powers of the Entente after a previous understanding, and with the omission of all that showed how the conspiracy hung together; indeed, in all probability he glorified them against his better judgment, deliberately and craftily turning the German publications to his own account, in order to make his theses believable. Under the title "The Diplomatic Struggles Before the War," and with the use of citations that drive his points home, these questions have been examined by Ludwig Bergsträsser with scientific thoroughness, exhaustively and impartially. Of the arguments and assertions of the "Accuser" it leaves not a single point unrefuted. In the most recent number of the Historical Magazine of Meinecke and Vigener Pp. 48-592 Bergsträsser's excellent study is published. Be it highly recommended to our readers. We add to this a reference to the excellent book of Dr. Ernst Müller-Meiningen: "The World War and the Collapse of International Law," (3rd edition. Berlin 1915. Published by George Reimer.) And finally, there have recently been added the despatches of the Belgian ambassadors from London, Paris, Berlin published by the "North German Gazette," where proceeds, from impartial lips, a loud protest against the intrigues which were woven by England, France and Russia, against the peace of the world. No other conclusion can be drawn from these documents. But the blood which has been shed in this war, and all the misery which has accompanied it, cries out to Heaven for vengeance. It will fall upon those who instigated the war!

But to the "Accuser," one word in conclusion. He calls his book a book of truth. In reality it is a book of miserable slanders, written out of the restless vanity of a life estranged from the soil of his native country; an act of revenge for a past for which he himself is to blame, an act which is forced to hide itself under the veil of anonymity. A man from whom every German turns away with loathing, and of whom, it will be said, when finally his name is given over to universal contempt: "God keep our children and our children's children from becoming like this man, who in the hour of the supreme struggle of our people for its existence, let himself be used as the herald of the enemies of Germany."

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